

APPEAL NO. 022232
FILED OCTOBER 7, 2002

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on August 6, 2002. The hearing officer determined that the respondent (claimant) sustained a compensable injury on _____, and that he had disability from April 10, 2002, and continuing through the date of the hearing. The appellant (carrier 1) appealed; the file does not contain a response from the claimant.

DECISION

Affirmed as reformed.

The parties stipulated that on the date of injury, the claimant was employed by (employer A) and that the carrier was carrier 1. The heading on the Decision and Order identifies Travelers Indemnity Company (carrier 2) as the carrier, and Findings of Fact 1(A) identifies (employer B) as the employer. Because of these clerical errors, we reform the heading of the Decision and Order to read that the carrier is carrier 1 and Finding of Fact 1(A) to read that on _____, claimant was the employee of employer A, in conformity with the stipulations.

The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant sustained a compensable injury on _____, and had resulting disability beginning on April 10, 2002, and continuing through the date of the hearing. We have reviewed the complained-of determinations and find that the hearing officer's Decision and Order is supported by sufficient evidence. The issues of injury and disability presented questions of fact for the hearing officer. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Section 410.165(a); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). There was conflicting evidence presented on the disputed issues. It was for the hearing officer, as the trier of fact, to resolve the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence and to determine what facts had been established. Garza v. Commercial Ins. Co., 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). Nothing in our review of the record reveals that the hearing officer's determinations are so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. As such, no sound basis exists for us to reverse those determinations on appeal. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).

The hearing officer's decision and order are affirmed as reformed herein.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**MR. PARKER W. RUSH
1445 ROSS AVENUE, SUITE 4200
DALLAS, TEXAS 75202-2812.**

Susan M. Kelley
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

Thomas A. Knapp
Appeals Judge

Margaret L. Turner
Appeals Judge